

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 11005 01 OF 04 261330Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----120663 261334Z /43  
O 261301Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5135  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11005

EXDIS DIST AS NODIS

E.O. 11652:GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, US, IS, EG  
SUBJECT: PRE-CAMP DAVID DISCUSSION WITH DAYAN

REF: A) STATE 215852, B) STATE 213798

SUMMARY: I MET WITH DAYAN AUGUST 25 TO DISCUSS THE  
CAMP DAVID MEETING. HE WAS GUARDELY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT  
THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. HE SAID HE BELIEVED U.S.  
AND ISRAEL COULD REACH AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE IDF  
WOULD REMAIN ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN A PURELY  
STRATEGIC ROLE, AND THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WOULD  
BE RESOLVED AFTER THE INTERIM PERIOD. IN ADDITION  
THERE WERE SEVERAL ISSUES ON WHICH ISRAEL AND EGYPT  
COULD AGREE. HOWEVER, DAYAN REMAINS WORRIED THAT SADAT  
WILL NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO ANY AGREEMENT ON SINAI  
BEFORE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARRANGEMENTS ARE FINALLY  
COMPLETED. THUS, ISRAEL WOULD BE ASKED TO MAKE  
EXTREMELY DIFFICULT COMPROMISES TO ACHIEVE A  
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WITHOUT ANY REAL ASSURANCE  
THAT IT WOULD BRING A PEACE TREATY ON SINAI. I SAID  
SADAT NEEDED SOME KIND OF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE  
WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THIS WAS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE  
FOR THE ISRAELIS TO GET WHAT THEY WANTED OUT OF CAMP

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SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11005 01 OF 04 261330Z

DAVID - A COMMITMENT FROM SADAT TO GO FORWARD ON THE  
SINAI.

STRESSING THAT THE KEY WORD IN ALL OF THIS WAS "WITHDRAWAL"  
I HOPED THAT DAYAN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE BEING  
INGENIOUS ABOUT THAT WORD WHICH HAD SO MUCH SYMBOLIC  
RESONANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. DAYAN CONGRATULATED

WASHINGTON FOR COMING UP WITH THE CONCEPT OF "ENDING MILITARY OCCUPATION" OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. AN ELABORATION OF THIS CONCEPT, IF COUPLED WITH EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED ONLY AFTER THE FIVE YEARS, COULD HOLD THE KEY TO SUCCESS AT CAMP DAVID. DAYAN HINTED STRONGLY THAT THE GOI WOULD BE WILLING UNAMBIGUOUSLY TO AGREE THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WOULD BE DECIDED AFTER THE INTERIM PERIOD IF OTHER ISSUES WERE RESOLVED TO ISRAEL'S SATISFACTION. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS, DAYAN ASSUMED THAT THIS WOULD BE A CENTRAL QUESTION THAT HUSSEIN AND THE LOCAL ARABS WOULD ASK BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS. NOTING THAT THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY TOUGH PROBLEM, DAYAN IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SOMETHING IN MIND ON THE SETTLEMENT QUESTION WHICH WOULD HELP ENTICE THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE GAME. DAYAN REPEATED THAT THE KEY QUESTION WAS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON SINAI, AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. ON THE ISSUE OF SINAI, MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON U.S. IF WE WERE WILLING TO TAKE OVER ONE OR TWO OF THE SINAI AIR BASES, IT WOULD GIVE A GREAT PUSH TO THE ISRAEL/EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS

DAYAN SAID THAT SADAT WOULD GET NOTHING BETTER FROM THE GOI ON THE APPLICABILITY OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242 THAN THE FORMULA GIVEN IN LATE APRIL IN WASHINGTON. I ASKED HIM  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11005 01 OF 04 261330Z

WHY THE ISRAELI AUTONOMY PLAN COULD NOT BE VERBALLY SEPARATED FROM STATEMENTS ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF 242; INSISTING THAT THE SELF-RULE IS CONSISTENT WITH 242 IMMEDIATELY CALLS INTO QUESTION ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT TO THE ACCEPTED INTERPRETATION OF 242. DAYAN ANSWERED THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT COMMIT ITSELF TO WITHDRAW TO "GOD KNOWS WHERE." A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW TO THE 67 BORDERS WITH ONLY "MINOR MODIFICATIONS", AS THE U.S. AND EGYPT DESIRED, WAS AN UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WHICH ALMOST NO ONE IN ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT.

IN CONCLUDING THE CONVERSATION, I STRESSED TO DAYAN THAT SADAT WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PARTIAL AGREEMENTS AND THAT THE GOI SHOULD REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS TO AVOID CONTENTIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER 5.

1. I MET WITH DAYAN FOR OVER AN HOUR AUGUST 25 TO DISCUSS THE CAMP DAVID MEETING. RUBINSTEIN AND BLACKWILL WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. DAYAN BEGAN BY SAYING HE FELT CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. THERE WERE AREAS WHERE PROGRESS COULD BE ACHIEVED. IN PARTICULAR, THERE

WERE TWO POINTS ON WHICH HE BELIEVED THE U.S. AND ISRAEL COULD COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING: IDF FORCES WOULD REMAIN ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN A PURELY STRATEGIC ROLE, AND NOT ONE WHICH INTERFERRED WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE INHABITANTS. THE QUESTION OF HOW LONG THESE FORCES WOULD STAY, WHERE THEY WOULD BE DEPLOYED, ETC., WERE MATTERS FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT IN PRINCIPLE DAYAN THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL COULD READILY AGREE.

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 11005 02 OF 04 261339Z  
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INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11005

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

THE OTHER POINT WHERE HE BELIEVED THE U.S. AND GOI COULD SEE EYE TO EYE WAS THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. EGYPT SAID THAT SOVEREIGNTY HAD TO BE DECIDED NOW AND IN THE ARABS' FAVOR. ISRAEL ARGUED THAT IT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED OR DECIDED AFTER FIVE YEARS. THE U.S. WANTED IT DISCUSSED DURING THE 5 YEARS AND DECIDED BY THE END OF 5 YEARS. SMILING, DAYAN SAID THAT THIS LOOKED LIKE AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPICAL THREE OPTION CHOICE WITH THE MIDDLE OPTION (SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE DISCUSSED DURING THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD) BEING THE FINAL OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. DAYAN WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL COULD FIND A COMMON SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM.

3. HE CONTINUED THAT THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL ISSUES ON WHICH ISRAEL AND EGYPT AGREED, ALTHOUGH THEY USED DIFFERENT LANGUAGE TO DESCRIBE THEIR POSITIONS. THEY BOTH WISH TO ABOLISH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THEY BOTH WANTED TO BUILD UP AN AUTONOMOUS PALESTINIAN ADMINISTRATION ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THEY BOTH SPOKE OF OPEN BORDERS AND A FREE FLOW OF PEOPLE AND GOODS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THESE TERRITORIES. AND, THE U.S., ISRAEL AND

EGYPT ALL SAW THE NEED FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

4. THUS, LOOKING AT THESE AREAS OF POTENTIAL AGREEMENT,  
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PAGE 02 TEL AV 11005 02 OF 04 261339Z

DAYAN REPEATED HE FELT SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTIC. EGYPT HAD THUS FAR NOT BEEN CLEAR AS TO WHEN A PEACE TREATY CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD BE SIGNED. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A FINAL ARRANGEMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED AT THE PRESENT TIME. ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO DECIDE THE ULTIMATE STATUS OF THESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES NOW. PERHAPS THIS MIGHT BE DONE AFTER THE FIVE YEARS, BUT THERE WERE TOO MANY UNKNOWNNS AT THE MOMENT.

5. DAYAN SAID THAT HE CONTINUED TO BE WORRIED THAT SADAT WAS NOT WILLING TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO A DEAL ON SINAI BEFORE ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WERE FINALLY AGREED. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD PROBABLY BE ASKE TO MAKE VERY DIFFICULT CONCESSIONS ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WITHOUT ANY ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD BRING A PEACE TREATY ON SINAI.

6. NOTING THAT DAYAN WAS RAISING A VERY FAMILIAR QUESTION, I ADMITTED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE THUS FAR TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. SADAT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HE COULD NOT STRIKE A BARGAIN ON SINAI WITHOUT SOME PUBLICLY AGREED PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HOWEVER, HE REMAINED RELUCTANT TO NEGOTIATE DETAILS CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA REGIME BECAUSE HE HAD NO REAL MANDATE TO DO SO. THUS, THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THESE TERRITORIES WHICH MET ISRAELI CONSTRAINTS, AND AT THE SAME TIME ALLOWED SADAT TO COME TO TERMS ON SINAI. SADAT NEEDED SOME KIND OF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THIS WAS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO THE ISRAELIS GETTING WHAT THEY WANTED OUT OF CAMP DAVID--A COMMITMENT BY SADAT TO GO FORWARD ON SINAI.

7. STRESSING THAT I BELIEVED THE KEY WORD IN ALL OF THIS  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11005 02 OF 04 261339Z

TO BE "WITHDRAWAL," I OBSERVED THAT THAT PARTICULAR WORD WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. I HOPED THAT DAYAN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD BE INGENIOUS ABOUT THE USE OF THE WORD SINCE IT HAD SO MUCH SYMBOLIC RESONANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. PERHAPS ANOTHER FORMULATION MIGHT SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE, BUT PERHAPS NOT. THE

ISRAELIS SHOULD BE BENDING THEIR MINDS TO FORMULATIONS WHICH ADDRESSED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE, EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT USE PRECISELY THAT WORD WITH RESPECT TO THE WEST BANK. BUT THE WORDS AND PHRASES USED ON THIS QUESTION AND THE OTHERS WHICH WOULD BE BEFORE US AT CAMP DAVID COULD NOT BE TRANSPARENT. THE PARTIES WOULD MERELY BE SETTING TIMEBOMBS. IF THEY AGREED TO LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD BE INTERPRETED TOO DIFFERENTLY AS SOON AS THEY RETURNED HOME.

8. DAYAN AGREED WITH MY EMPHASIS ON THIS ASPECT OF THE DILEMMA, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND TO THIS DIFFICULTY. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM OF DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS AFTER THE FACT BY ISRAEL AND EGYPT OF LANGUAGE THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO AT THE SUMMIT. THIS WAS THE REASON HE HAD NEVER BEEN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT FIRST CONCENTRATING ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. AT CAMP DAVID, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO START WITH THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD BE REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, BEFORE TRYING TO "WRITE THE HEADLINES."

9. DAYAN THEN CONGRATULATED "WHOEVER IN WASHINGTON" HAD COME UP WITH THE CONCEPT OF ENDING THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IF THAT OCCUPATION ENDED, THEN THE IDF WOULD REMAIN ONLY AS A STRATEGIC PRESENCE. BEGIN

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 11005 03 OF 04 261348Z  
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11005

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE WORD "OCCUPATION," BUT THIS CONCEPT COULD BE USED TO MEET SADAT'S DESIRE FOR A COMMITMENT FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I INTERJECTED THAT A KEY PROBLEM WAS TO DESCRIBE THIS CONCEPT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD BE PSYCHO-

LOGICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE MODERATE ARABS.

10. DAYAN AGREED AND SAID OVERCOMING THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE WAS ONLY HALF THE KEY TO SUCCESS AT CAMP DAVID. THE OTHER HALF WOULD REQUIRE EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT THAT SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE "DISCUSSED, OR DECIDED" AFTER FIVE YEARS, OR NEAR THE END OF FIVE YEARS. SADAT WOULD HAVE TO REALIZE THAT HE COULD NOT GET A COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL TO A DECISION NOW ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. IT WAS SIMPLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THIS ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. BUT IF SADAT COULD AGREE THAT A SOLUTION TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WOULD BE FOUND AFTER FIVE YEARS, AND THAT THE IDF WOULD END ITS OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, THEN AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. ISRAEL WOULD NOT EXPECT SADAT TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITH ONLY THESE TWO THINGS IN HAND, SO HE WOULD NOT BE PAYING FOR MORE THAN HE WAS GETTING. INDEED THE ARABS WOULD BE GETTING A GOOD DEAL UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT. THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD HAVE THE FREEDOM TO RUN THEIR OWN LIVES,  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11005 03 OF 04 261348Z

AND DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD JORDAN, EGYPT, THE PALESTINIAN ARABS IN THE TERRITORIES, AND ISRAEL WOULD DISCUSS AND AGREE TO A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

11. I NOTED THAT DAYAN HAD USED THE WORDS "DISCUSS SOVEREIGNTY AFTER FIVE YEARS" AND "DECIDE ON SOVEREIGNTY AFTER FIVE YEARS" ALMOST INTERCHANGEABLY. THERE WAS CERTAINLY A GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO, AND IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IF ISRAEL COULD AGREE UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED AFTER THE INTERIM PERIOD. WITH AN IMPISH GRIN DAYAN SAID, "WE HAVE NOT EVEN STARTED NEGOTIATING YET AT CAMP DAVID," CLEARLY INFERRING THAT SUCH A COMPROMISE WAS AT LEAST POSSIBLE AT THE SUMMIT IF OTHER ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED TO ISRAEL'S SATISFACTION.

12. DAYAN THEN ALLOWED THAT A CRITICAL QUESTION WOULD BE WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERIM REGIME. I STRESSED THAT WOULD DEPEND TO A LARGE EXTENT UPON THEIR PERSONAL COURAGE, ON WHETHER HUSSEIN WOULD PROVIDE SUPPORT PUBLICLY OR AT LEAST PRIVATELY, AND ON THE AGREED FRAMEWORK WHICH WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE TERRITORIES. OBVIOUSLY THE GOAL WAS TO CREATE A FRAMEWORK WHICH WOULD CONVINCE HUSSEIN TO ENTER THE PROCESS DIRECTLY OR AT A MINIMUM TO URGE THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK TO COOPERATE. DAYAN THEN SAID CRYPTICALLY THAT HE WOULD KNOW MORE ABOUT HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE ON THIS MATTER BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

13. TURNING TO THE PROBLEM OF SETTLEMENTS, DAYAN SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THAT THIS WOULD BE A CENTRAL QUESTION FOR HUSSEIN AND THE LOCAL ARABS. UNDER THE TERMS THAT WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING, THE PALESTINIANS WOULD GET THE ABOLITION  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11005 03 OF 04 261348Z

OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND REAL SELF-GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN. THAT, HOWEVER, WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ENOUGH. A KEY POINT IN LOCAL PALESTINIAN APPROVAL OF THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. DAYAN SAID "THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY TOUGH PROBLEM." (DURING THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION, DAYAN IMPLIED BY HIS COMMENTS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SOMETHING IN MIND ON SETTLEMENTS WHICH WOULD HELP ENTICE THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE GAME.)

14. I NEXT ASKED DAYAN DIRECTLY WHAT HE THOUGHT COULD BE ACHIEVED AT CAMP DAVID. (HE HAD SEEN A REPORT OF THE ATHERTON-DINITZ CONVERSATION - REF A.) HE SAID THERE WAS ONE QUESTION UPON WHICH HIS ANSWER WOULD DEPEND. WHAT WAS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT ON SINAI AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HE ACCEPTED THAT SADAT HAD TO HAVE SOMETHING ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION WHICH HE WOULD THEN TRY TO CONVINCE HUSSEIN AND THE LOCAL PALESTINIANS TO SUPPORT. BUT WOULD HE REQUIRE A FINAL TREATY ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BEFORE HE WOULD SIGN A TREATY ON SINAI? WOULD HE SAY THAT HE COULD ONLY INITIAL THE SINAI ACCORD NOW, COULD NOT MAKE IT FINAL, COULD NOT NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL UNTIL THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS FINALLY SOLVED? OR WOULD HE MOVE ON SINAI AFTER A WEST BANK-GAZA FRAMEWORK WAS AGREED?

15. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION WHICH ALTERNATIVE DAYAN THOUGHT MORE LIKELY, HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON U.S. VIEWS AT THE SUMMIT. DAYAN HAD HEARD RECENT TALK "FROM WASHINGTON" ABOUT A POSSIBLE U.S. WILLINGNESS TO OCCUPY ONE OR TWO OF THE SINAI AIRBASES. IF U.S. WERE WILLING TO DO THAT, IT WOULD GIVE A GREAT PUSH TO THE ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL MIGHT BE LEFT WITH ONE SINAI AIRFIELD FOR ITS USE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, TWO OTHERS COULD BE TAKEN OVER BY THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 11005 03 OF 04 261348Z

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 11005 04 OF 04 261357Z  
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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11005

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

U.S., AND ISRAEL COULD THEN BUILD ONE WITHIN ITS '67  
BORDERS FOR LATER SUBSTITUTION. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT  
WOULD SOLVE MOST OF THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF THE SINAI,  
AND IF THE U.S. PUSHED FOR IT, IT COULD MAKE A GREAT  
DEAL OF DIFFERENCE. BUT IF WASHINGTON WAS UNWILLING TO  
GO THIS FAR, THEN DAYAN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF SADAT  
WOULD BE READY TO SIGN A BILATERAL DEAL WITH ISRAEL.

16. I REPEATED TO DAYAN THAT I COULD NOT IMAGINE THAT  
SADAT COULD DO ANYTHING CONSEQUENTIAL ON SINAI UNLESS  
HE COULD POINT TO REAL ACHIEVEMENT ON THE PALESTINIAN  
PROBLEM. HE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT  
WITH ISRAEL ON THE PALESTINIANS WHICH HE COULD PUBLICLY  
DEFEND BEFORE HIS ARAB BROTHERS. DAYAN AGREED BUT SAID  
THAT SADAT WOULD GET NOTHING BETTER IN A PUBLIC  
STATEMENT FROM THE GOI ON THE APPLICABILITY OF U.N.  
RESOLUTION 242 TO THE WEST BANK THAN THE PROPOSED  
LANGUAGE GIVEN TO US IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL, AND,  
THAT THE GOI CONSIDERS THAT ITS AUTONOMY PLAN FOR THE WEST  
BANK AND GAZA IS AN APPROPRIATE WAY TO IMPLEMENT THAT  
RESOLUTION. SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WAS THE MAXIMUM,  
DAYAN SAID THAT THIS ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD AGREE TO.

17. RESPONDING, I ASKED DAYAN WHY STATEMENTS ABOUT THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11005 04 OF 04 261357Z



AUTONOMY PLAN COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM STATEMENTS ABOUT 242, SINCE THE WAY HE HAD JUST ASSERTED THEIR LINKAGE INEVITABLY CALLED INTO QUESTION ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE ACCEPTED INTERPRETATION OF 242. DAYAN RATHER SHARPLY ANSWERED MY QUESTION BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT COMMIT ITSELF TO WITHDRAWAL "TO GOD KNOWS WHERE". THE U.S. CONTINUED TO TALK ABOUT "MINOR BORDER MODIFICATIONS". SADAT'S POSITION WAS EVEN MORE STRINGENT. A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL TO NEAR THE 67 BORDERS WAS AN UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WHICH ALMOST NO ONE IN ISRAEL COULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT. IN SOME WAYS THE GOI HAD GONE FURTHER THAN EVER BEFORE IN ITS AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS A TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. BUT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT MINOR BORDER MODIFICATIONS. THE PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF 242 WAS AS FAR AS BEGIN AND DAYAN AND THE CABINET WERE WILLING TO GO.

18. CHANGING THE SUBJECT, I SAID I HAD BEEN CONCERNED IN THE LAST WEEKS TO SEE THE ISRAELIS PRACTICING WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED "SELF-HYPNOSIS" ABOUT WHAT SADAT WAS READY TO DO AT THIS POINT. ABOUT A MONTH AGO, PEOPLE BEGAN TO TALK ABOUT PARTIAL AGREEMENTS, AND FROM READING BEGIN TO RABIN NOW HAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS OUTCOME IS LIKELY. I TOLD DAYAN I TRUSTED THAT HE KNEW THAT THAT IS NOT WHAT SADAT HAS IN MIND FOR CAMP DAVID. DAYAN IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT THIS IDEA RESULTED FROM SADAT'S TALK TO WEIZMAN ABOUT A "GESTURE". ALTHOUGH ISRAEL WOULD NOT SIMPLY HAND OVER EL ARISH TO THE EGYPTIANS, A RECIPROCAL DEAL MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. BUT THIS HAD ONLY BEEN CONSIDERED BECAUSE SADAT HAD IMPLICITLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY. OTHERWISE, DAYAN SAID, "WE WOULD NOT TOUCH IT." ON THE CONTRARY, ISRAELIS SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S CONCEPT OF TRYING FOR A FULL PEACE AGREEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11005 04 OF 04 261357Z

IT WAS WITH THAT OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION WAS GOING TO CAMP DAVID. BUT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER SADAT COULD BE CONVINCED TO DEFER THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. DAYAN REPEATED THAT SETTLEMENTS WOULD ALSO BE A TOUGH PROBLEM.

19. I THEN OBSERVED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH PREVAILED IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY HAD MENTIONED WHEN HE WAS LAST HERE THE IMPORTANCE OF A MORATORIUM ON CONTENTIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE EGYPTIAN PRESS SINCE THAT TIME HAD BEEN UNDER WRAPS AND HAD GENERALLY AVOIDED PROVOCATION BUT IT WAS GETTING RESTIVE AND KAMEL HAD RECENTLY COMPLAINED ABOUT STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ISRAEL. I SAID I KNEW THE GOI HAD MADE A CONSCIENTIOUS

EFFORT TO TONE DOWN THE NOISE LEVEL, BUT I URGED DAYAN TO REDOUBLE THOSE EFFORTS BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER 5. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN BEGIN'S NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW, REPEATING TRADITIONAL ISRAELI POSITIONS HAD NOT MADE THE ATMOSPHERE IN CAIRO ANY BETTER. DAYAN WAS DECIDELY NON-COMMITTAL IN HIS RESPONSE TO THIS ARGUMENT, CLEARLY SUGGESTING BY HIS SILENCE THAT WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID BETWEEN NOW AND THE SUMMIT WAS NOT IN DAYAN'S HANDS. (COMMENT: I AM SEEING BEGIN TONIGHT BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON AND WILL MAKE SAME POINT STRONGLY TO HIM. DAN PATTIR, BEGIN'S PRESS SPOKESMAN, HAS ASSURED US THAT BEGIN PLANS NO RPT NO MORE INTERVIEWS UNTIL AFTER CAMP DAVID.) LEWIS

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## Message Attributes

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**Control Number:** n/a  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** PEPR, PBOR, US, IS, (DAYAN, MOSHE)  
**To:** STATE SS MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
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